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Executive Summary
• Biology is a powerful technology
– Processing information
– Fabricating materials
– Converting energy
– Maintaining & enhancing health
• Biological technology poses a danger on par with any past experience
– Existing threats
– Emerging threats
– Engineered threats
• Synthetic biology advances science & technology while mitigating danger
– General capability to engineer biological systems
– Increased speed and scope of response to threats
ApplicationsSystemsParts & 
Fabrication
Design
Biology is a technology for processing information, materials, and
energy.  As a technology platform, biological systems provide access to artifacts
and processes across a range of scales (e.g., the ribosome is a programmable
nanoassembler, a bamboo shoot can grow 12” per day).  Biology also forms the
basis for human welfare (e.g., modest amounts of memory and logic,
implemented as genetically encoded systems,would directly impact biological
research and medicine).  However, our ability to deploy biology as a
technology and to interact intentionally with the living world is now
limited; the charge to our study was to begin to specify enabling technologies
that, if developed, would provide a general foundation for the engineering of
biology and make routine the creation of synthetic biological systems that behave
as predicted.
We focused on improvements to the process of engineering biological systems.
Three specific process improvements that should be pursued now are:
(i) component standardization, (ii) substrate and component
abstraction, and (iii) design and fabrication decoupling.
The development of technologies that enable the systematic engineering of
biology must take place within the context of current and future risks due to
natural and engineered biological agents. While the development of technologies
for engineering biology appears inevitable, and their distribution uncontrollable,
the net impact such technologies will have on the creation of biological risk is not
known. However, any technology-based increase in risk creation seems likely to at
least be offset by a concomitant increase in the speed and scope of response to
risks. Consequently, any meaningful strategy for minimizing future
biological risk requires that the development of technologies for
engineering biology proceeds alongside the development of non-
technical approaches to risk management; new training programs and
professional societies will serve an important role in creating a cadre of engineers
who can work in biology and who will serve as a strategic resource for responding
to natural and engineered biological threats.
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Study Participants
• Drew Endy (chair)
• Patrick Lincoln (co-chair)
• Richard Murray (co-chair)
• Frances Arnold (Caltech)
• Ralph Baric (UNC)
• Roger Brent (TMSI)
• Rob Carlson (U.Washington)
• Jim Collins (BU)
• Lynn Conway (Michigan)
• Ron Davis (Stanford)
• Mita Desai (NSF)
• Eric Eisenstadt (DARPA)
• Stephanie Forrest (U.New Mexico)
• Seth Goldstein (CMU)
• Homme Hellinga (Duke)
• Tom Kalil (UC Berkeley)
• Jay Keasling (UC Berkeley)
• Doug Kirkpatrick (DARPA)
• Tom Knight (MIT)
• Bill Mark (SRI)
• John Mulligan (Blue Heron)
• Radhika Nagpal (MIT/Harvard)
• Carl Pabo (Sangamo)
• Randy Rettberg (MIT)
• Pam Silver (Harvard)
• Brad Smith (Johns Hopkins)
• Christina Smolke (Caltech)
• Gerry Sussman (MIT)
• Jack Thorpe (ISAT)
• Claire Tomlin (Stanford)
• Jeff Way (Lexigen)
• Chris Webb (Stanford)
• Ron Weiss (Princeton)
• Erik Winfree (Caltech)
Study participants included representatives from universities, industry, and
government. Participants provided expertise in basic biological research,
biological systems modeling, DNA synthesis, device analysis & design, self-
assembly, systems analysis & design, computer science, electrical
engineering, engineering theory, and biological security. Rich Entlich and
other staff provided expert organizational support throughout the study.
The study held three workshops and four executive meetings:
1. October 23-24th (2002) at the Beckman Center in Irvine, CA
2. March 3-4th (2003) at SRI, Inc. in San Mateo, CA (workshop)
3. March 24-25th at Norton’s Woods in Cambridge, MA (workshop)
4. April 10-11th at IDA in Alexandria, VA
5. May 29-30th at Caltech in Pasadena, CA (workshop)
6. August 18-22nd at Johnson House in Woods Hole, MA
7. October 8th in Alexandria, VA
The following related events occurred while the study was underway:
1. IBEA contracted by DOE to synthesize a bacterial genome (11/02)
[see http://www.bioenergyalts.org/news.html]
2. MIT conducts Synthetic Biology Lab (1/03)
[see http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/nr/2003/blinkers.html]
3. Caltech announces Center for Biological Circuit Design (3/03)
[see http://www.eas.caltech.edu/engenious/win03/cbcd.pdf]
4. EU NEST proposes Synthetic Biology research program (8/03)
[see ftp://ftp.cordis.lu/pub/nest/docs/synthetic_biology.pdf]
5. Lawrence Berkeley Lab creates Dept. of Synthetic Biology (8/03)
[see http://www.lbl.gov/LBL-Programs/pbd/news/newsletter/]
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Application
Current Workflow
SystemDevicesDesign &Fabrication
At present, the design and fabrication of any specific engineered
biological system is an ad hoc process. The process often involves
fundamental scientific research, making impossible accurate prediction of final
system behavior and time-to-delivery. Furthermore, building any one system
does not directly enable the construction of other engineered biological
systems.  For a given application, work begins with the coupled design and
fabrication of unique, application-specific components that, given further work,
can sometimes be assembled into a functioning system.  By contrast, “mature”
engineering disciplines (e.g., mechanical, electrical, civil, and software) can
routinely integrate large numbers of well-characterized components to produce
many functioning systems.
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Application
Scaleable Workflow
SystemsParts & 
Fabrication
Design Applications
Tools Registries
Synthesis
Measurement
Biology presents a new medium for engineering; we expect to encounter many
medium-specific challenges (e.g., evolution).  Still, a scaleable development
path for biological systems engineering can make use of past successful
experience in other engineering disciplines.  The approach that emerged over
the course of the study is informed by three past lessons:
 (1) Standardization of components (mechanical engineering, 1800s).
Libraries of standard parts that allow a combination of systems to be designed
and assembled.
(2) Component abstraction (from physics to electrical engineering, 1900s).
Standard parts can be defined prior to absolute scientific knowledge; many
knowable facts are unnecessary.  Simpler representations of many-component
devices help to manage complexity and increase attainable system scale.
(3) Decoupling of design & fabrication (VLSI electronics, 1970s).
Engineered systems can be designed by experts to exploit every detail of a
particular fabrication process. However, too much attention to such details
limits both the rate of design and the complexity of designable systems.
In addition to the above, improvements in four technical areas would help to
enable the engineering of biological systems:
(1) Registries of standard biological parts that coordinate parts synthesis
and system assembly, and help to develop and promulgate standards of
practice (e.g., design, fabrication, and characterization).
(2) Long polymer nucleic acid synthesis enabling rapid delivery of new
components and systems.
(3) Design, simulation, and analysis tools that make use of standard parts
and methods of assembly.
(4) Methods and standards for measurement that enable rapid system
characterization and refinement.
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Synthetic Systems
λ cI-857OLac RBS T
cILacI
LacI
cI
Michael Elowitz c.1999
Synthetic biological systems are currently created from natural
biological “parts” via an expert-driven design and fabrication
process.
For example, a genetic “inverter” based on well-known natural biological parts
regulating gene expression in bacteria is shown (top left).  The inverter is built
from a “repressor” protein (LacI) that acts on an operator (O_Lac) to inhibit
transcription of the DNA-encoded elements to the right of O_Lac.  Absent
inhibition at O_Lac, RNA molecules encoding both a ribosome binding site
(RBS) and the gene cI-857 are produced.  The resulting RNA are translated to
create a new protein (cI).
The inverter’s transfer function (bottom left) depicts the relationship between
inverter input (concentration of LacI protein) and output (concentration of cI
protein).  A ring oscillator can be created by linking three such inverters in a
cyclic system (A inverts B inverts C inverts A).
The actual behavior of bacterial cells containing a genetically-encoded ring
oscillator is shown (right); cells blink over time as a function of oscillator state
- see Elowitz et al. in Nature v403 p335, “A synthetic oscillatory network of
transcriptional regulators.”
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Parts: Standardization & Libraries
…
Bardeen & Brattain c. 1947 M1752, Western Electric c. 1951 Many sorts, most places, c. 2003
Zif268, Paveltich & Pabo c. 1991 Random Zif268s, Greisman & Pabo c. 1997
TATAZF-6 & TATAZF-2, Wolfe et al. c. 2001
The ring oscillator on the preceding page took an expert over a year to design and
build; the system makes use of three of the best-characterized natural proteins that
regulate gene expression in bacteria. Today, an electrical engineer could build a ring
oscillator in ~5 minutes by, for example, taking a N7404A hex-inverter “off the shelf”
and connecting three of the inverters in a cycle using standard gauge wire.
To enable the routine production of many-component integrated biological
systems we should develop libraries of standard biological parts. Initially,
most parts will be “harvested” from natural systems.  Development of domain
specific parts would enable the engineering of systems responsive to different
applications of biological technology.  Parts specific to the following application areas
would find immediate use: biological information processing and control, material
fabrication, metabolism and energy production, and human health.
Also, it is worth noting that the continued improvement and successful application of
computation-based design of ligand-domain reactions will help to enable the
engineering of synthetic parts libraries - e.g., see Looger et al. in Nature v423 p185,
“Computational design of receptor and sensor proteins with novel function.” We
should foster the transition from the collection and characterization of
natural parts, to the design and fabrication of libraries of synthetic parts.
One early example of the transition from natural to synthetic parts is likely to be the
development of a library of synthetic DNA binding proteins for use in the regulation
of gene expression; “back of the envelope” estimates suggest that a standard library
of ~1,000 zinc-finger protein:DNA binding site pairs can be created with < 1% intra-
library component “crosstalk.”  Crosstalk refers to the fact that biological systems are
often composed of self-mixing molecules. Specificity of interaction is determined by
non-covalent interactions between molecule surfaces (in contrast to wires that
determine component interactions in electrical circuits); non-specific or unintended
molecule-molecule interactions can create undesirable side-effects in biological
systems.
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Parts: Abstraction
λ cI-857OLac RBS T
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We also need to promote the characterization and representation of
standard biological parts in ways that insulate relevant physical
characteristics from overwhelming physical detail.  For example, the
four DNA elements defining a typical genetic inverter (above left) are organized
such that the concentration of the LacI and cI protein are the inverter input
and output, respectively; the result is a unique device with characteristics
specific to LacI and cI (transfer function, bottom left).  If LacI protein were
used to regulate a different output (e.g., TetR protein) then a new device,
requiring additional characterization, would be created.  Instead, by
reorganizing the genetic components, we can create an inverter that is
independent of specific input and output chemicals (top right); device
characteristics are now defined as a function of input and output rates (bottom
right).  The resulting inverter can be used in combination with any other so-
structured device.  Also, for the purpose of integrated system design, the four
component inverter (top right) can be replaced with a simpler representation of
a new part, a “quad-part inverter” (middle right).
Again, representations of biological systems should (1) provide simple
descriptions of complex, oftentimes poorly understood, biological
components and processes and (2) allow the creation of parts that can
be used in combination with other parts (e.g., parts whose inputs and
outputs are not specific to other parts).
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Decouple: DNA Synthesis
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The above plot gives the bulk number of nucleotides that can be assembled into
short chain oligomers by an individual during an 8-hour work day - see Carlson,
Biosecurity & Biotechnology v1(3), “Pace & Proliferation of Biological
Technologies.” The increase in DNA synthesis capacity has been driven largely
by process parallelization; anecdotal reports suggest that equivalent
technology is available worldwide.  For scale, the length of a typical part is
~1,000 bases, the length of a small integrated system is ~10,000 bases, and
the length of a genome encoding a “simple” free-living cell is ~1,000,000 bases.
One critical factor not represented on the above plot is the time to
delivery of a fully-assembled long chain oligomer.  Commercial delivery
times for an assembled 10,000 base DNA oligomer are now ~10 weeks.  Other
limiting factors are specific to various fabrication processes.  For example,
methods based on short chain oligomer-assembly followed by cloning and
ligation allow for exact synthesis but require extra time for the processing of
assembly intermediates (e.g., cloning and sequencing); such methods are also
limited by the potential genetic instability of assembly intermediates.  Synthesis
methods based on in-vitro assembly (e.g., PCR) can be faster but often accrue
errors during synthesis and assembly that carry forward into the final product.
DNA sequencing technology underwent a similar increase in capacity beginning
~1980; the science of biology changed in response (e.g., the genome projects,
bioinformatics, and systems biology).  Today, researchers in an average biology
lab might spend half their time manipulating DNA molecules. Continued
improvements in DNA synthesis technology should, in addition to
promoting biological engineering, help change biology from a
“discovery” science to a “synthetic” science (a lá the development of
synthetic chemistry) and help to enable a more rapid response to
future biological risks.
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Decouple: Design, Parts & Fab., Systems
– Model-based design using standard biological parts
– Parts fabrication via commercial suppliers
Synchronization of 
an oscillator, IAP ‘03
8 Jan
15 Jan
22 Jan
29 Jan
8/03
Just as being able to read DNA via genome-scale sequencing efforts has not
immediately translated into a perfect understanding of nature’s designs, our
increasing ability to write DNA via de novo synthesis will not, by
itself, result in useful engineered biological systems.
During January 2003, MIT conducted a four-week long experimental course in
which 16 students were asked to design genetically-encoded oscillators using
an early version of what future biological engineers might call “protein-DNA
logic” (or PDL).  Students were given a 20,000 base pair DNA synthesis
budget.  In addition, students were asked to design their systems using
standard biological parts such that the resulting parts could be used in more
than one system (i.e., parts were shared across the class).  The course
workflow was: (i) model-based system design, (ii) model-driven simulation,
(iii) layout, documentation, and plan of characterization, (iv) parts ordering via
commercial suppliers, and (v) parts return and system assembly.   Design,
simulation, layout and documentation took one month.  Editing the student-
specified parts and placing the parts synthesis order took two months.  Parts
synthesis required another one to five months.  System assembly from
standard parts is taking an additional four months, for a total elapsed time of
one year.  Current estimates are that the 2004 course will run to completion in
five months and that, given current technology, three months start-finish will
be realized. The students who participated in the course did not
perform laboratory experiments, instead they worked as standard
biological parts, device, and system engineers.
By decoupling design and fabrication it will become possible to build more
complex systems.  The decoupling of system design and fabrication will
simultaneously enable a new cadre of engineers to participate in the
analysis and design of biological systems.
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Decouple: Registries of Standard Parts
• Maintain & promulgate
standards of practice
– Design
– Characterization
– Protocols & Exchange
– Applications
• Coordinate parts
synthesis
• Coordinate system
assembly
The usefulness of standard biological parts depends on parts characterization
via common standards of description and also parts availability via common
protocols of exchange. In addition, system assembly requires coordination of
de novo DNA synthesis and final system assembly with bulk-service providers;
as with DNA sequencing, DNA synthesis will benefit from economies of scale.
Registries of standard biological parts should be created to best meet
these requirements.
A standard biological parts registry is similar in concept to the MOSIS service
provided to the VLSI electronics community [see http://www.mosis.org/]. By
serving as a focal point for community organization registries will
provide a mechanism for community-wide organization and the
development and propagation of standards of practice.  Furthermore,
such community-wide organization will help launch the future organizations
(private and public) that will support the engineering of many-component
integrated biological systems.
At present, DNA synthesis and system assembly is slow and expensive (i.e.,
fabrication is currently a limiting technology).  As a result, early registries will
need to provide both the physical DNA itself and the information specifying
DNA sequence and encoded genetic function. In the future, if and when DNA
sequence information becomes fungible with DNA molecules, knowledge of
what to synthesize will be limiting.  At such time, the role of registries should
shift to serve as maintainers and providers of the information specifying and
describing parts.
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Risk
Biological Risk: Background
Technology Classes Relevant to Biological Risk
(current relative capabilities)
Manipulation
Analysis
Response
Detection
Both nature’s, and our own, ability to manipulate biological systems outpaces
our ability to detect biological agents, analyze the resulting data, and respond
appropriately.  As a result, we risk exposure to existing, emerging, and
engineered biological threats (graphic above).
While the purpose of our study was to specify general technologies that, if
developed, would directly enable the systematic engineering of biological
systems, these discussions necessarily took place in the context of
current and perceived future biological risks.
Two issues dominated our risk-related discussions.  First, the “dual-use”
dilemma as it relates to biological technology - any useful technology might
also be intentionally or accidentally misapplied to cause harm.  A recent
National Academies report provides expert background, analysis, and
discussion of the dual-use dilemma for past and current biotechnology - see
Fink et al., National Research Council of the National Academies (2003),
“Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use"
Dilemma.”   Second, the probable inability to control the distribution of
technologies needed to manipulate biological systems and, lacking
advances in other technology classes (i.e., detection, analysis, and
response), a consequent increasing future vulnerability to
engineered biological threats.
Can the current gap between manipulation and detection, analysis,
and response be closed?
Do technologies that enable biological engineering help or hinder
closure of the risk gap?
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Biological Risk: Tactics as “Strategy”
Maginot Line
France, 1940
Ciprofloxacin
Smallpox
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Anthrax
vaccine
SARS assay
VHF therapy
(under construction)
Plague vaccine
(under construction)
The “conventional wisdom” within the biological research community is that
current threat dynamics are largely driven by nature, and take the form of
emerging infectious diseases.  For example, the 2002 SARS outbreak killed
more people than the 2001 anthrax attacks; both would pale in comparison to
a repeat of the 1918 influenza pandemic. Many biologists ask if it is possible to
intentionally “improve” existing pathogens, somehow bettering nature’s
designs. Importantly, the rate of natural threat emergence is slow enough
such that the development and deployment of threat-specific responses are
oftentimes considered to be “adequate.”
The experience of the biological research community with modern technology-
based risk dates to the creation of recombinant DNA technology - in the 1970s
it became possible to create chimeric DNA absent a perfect ability to predict
the properties of the resulting molecule. Today, three additional factors
are beginning to impact the biological risk landscape: (i) public
databases of DNA sequence and computation-based design tools are enabling
rapid and “lab-free” access to knowledge of what DNA to synthesize, (ii) public
access to DNA synthesis is enabling anonymous fabrication (e.g., website,
credit card, and FedEx), (iii) individuals might act to intentionally misapply
biological engineering technologies.
In considering these new factors, study participants concluded that
future biological threats will increasingly arise via the intentional or
accidental (i.e., “michanikogenic”) application of biological
technology. Importantly, the rate of biological threat emergence is
likely to become great enough to overwhelm current response
technologies. We are (appropriately) developing and deploying
“fixed assets” against existing, relatively-static biological threats
(graphic above).  However, future biological risks are likely to be
greater in number, more sophisticated in design and scope, and more
rapidly developed and deployed.
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Biological Risk: Future Strategy
Risk
Technology Classes Relevant to Future Biological Risk
(needed capabilities)
Detection
Analysis
Response
Manipulation
A conservative discussion of strategy for minimizing biological risk would begin
with three grounding assumptions.  First, that we already can not control
the distribution of technology and information enabling the
manipulation of biological systems and that future technologies are also
unlikely to be controllable.  Second, ineffective attempts to forbid access
to some of the basic technologies for manipulating biology would
likely incur prohibitive costs in the form of lost opportunities for
improving human health and gaining scientific knowledge. Third, that
threats could arise from nature, nation states, loosely organized groups, and
individuals, and could be targeted against any part of the living world relevant
to human welfare (i.e., biological threats are asymmetric in (i) source of
agent,  (ii) choice of target, and (iii) time to create versus respond,
below).
Given the above context, the rate of detection, analysis, and response to
new threats becomes critical; a biological agent that took years to evolve
and emerge, or be engineered and released, might require coordinated
detection, analysis, and response within weeks.  In addition, the breadth of
possible targets requires that detection, analysis, and response capabilities be
as general as practically possible and are, at least in part, accessible to a
distributed network of end users.  By analogy, computer network security relies
heavily on the fact that all users have access to tools and resources for the
detection, analysis, and response to network threats - but note that any net
contribution via distributed security requires that most users have a vested
interest in maintaining network function (next page).
Technologies enabling the engineering of biology would directly
contribute to a rapid and predictable response to biological threats
(e.g., pre-positioning components of standard vaccine vectors, 24h synthesis of
DNA encoding multi-antigen-domain proteins, et cetera). In addition, a cadre
of engineers familiar with the design of biological systems would help
to enable more rapid threat analysis.
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Biological Risk: Suite of Solutions
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However, the same technologies that are needed to help enable rapid
responses to new biological threats could also be used to help create the
threats themselves.  Thus, it is necessary to consider how future
biological technology can be combined with non-technical solutions
in order to minimize both the number of sources of future biological
risks, and the scope of the risks themselves.  What steps can be
taken now, at the beginning of the field, to minimize the number of
individuals who could or would act to cause harm via future
biological technology (graphic above)?  As one simple example,
biological engineering training could include professional development
programs and codes of ethics; a well conceived and responsibly implemented
plan for educating future generations of biological engineers would help to
expand strategic human resources for future biological defense.  As a second
example, registries managing standard biological parts could encourage
responsible practice on the part of commercial DNA synthesis providers (e.g.,
“we’ll only renew our synthesis contract if you can assure us that you are not
synthesizing known threat agents”).
Non-technical approaches contributing to future biological security might
range from legal incentives and penalties, to social rewards and
stigmatization, to methods of training and practice, et cetera. Much more
investigation and discussion of the role of non-technical components
in a suite of solutions for biological risk mitigation is warranted.
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• Enable the engineering of biology via parts, abstraction, and decoupling
– Predictable performance
– Rapid system development via a scalable development process
– Transition in scope, from single- to many-component systems
• Broad application space
– Sensing
– Materials
– Metabolism & Energy
– Health
• Tools & standards needed for
– Design
– Parts Fabrication & Distribution
– Integrated System Assembly
– Characterization
Conclusion: Technical Summary
ApplicationsSystemsParts & 
Fabrication
Design
Biology is a technology for processing information, materials, and energy.
However, our ability to deploy biology as a technology and to interact
intentionally with the living world is now limited.
 A scaleable development path for engineering biology can be realized by
combining (i) component standardization, (ii) substrate and component
abstraction, and (iii) design and fabrication decoupling.
These three general advances should be combined with the development of
“registries” that create and maintain libraries of standard biological parts,
improvements in DNA synthesis technology, device and system design tools,
and methods and standards for measurement and characterization.
Lastly, the development of technologies for engineering biology must be
accompanied by ongoing discussions of non-technical approaches that help to
minimize future biological risk.
18
2003 Synthetic Biology Study
18October 8, 2003
Conclusion: Technology Roadmap
Near (2004) Mid (2007) Far (2013)
Education Course @ MIT, Caltech, 
Princeton, BU, UT Austin
Textbooks
CSHL short course
Courses everywhere
High school demos
Quantify mRNA, 
proteins from
single cells
Rates of reactions
Non-destructive
assay of relevant
state of single cell
Information
tracing
DNA foundries
(6-week turnaround)
Rapid prototyping 
(2-4 weeks)
DNA printing
(24 hours)Registries
Parts
Measure
Design
Tools
MIT
Short
Course
“BioBricks”
Component models
for parts
(synthesis oriented)
Levels of reactants
Now (2003)
     Synthetic parts Intentionally Engineered Cells
                     Post-translational logic (PTL)
              MIT Registry (protein-DNA logic in prokaryotes)
System models
DNA compiler 
(system function to DNA)
Higher 
level tools 
A general foundation for engineering biology will require newly developed
training programs, standard parts libraries, tools for parts management &
system assembly (i.e., registries), measurement technologies, and design tools.
The development of these capabilities over the next decade will depend on the
successful combination of past and ongoing results from basic biological
research with advances in biological systems engineering.  The chart above
depicts a “best-case,” funding-driven timeline for the development of such
capabilities.
Specifically, education of biological engineers is transitioning from stand-alone
courses like the one at MIT, to a cooperative five-school NSF-funded
competition in 2004, to the broader education community.  Registries of
standard biological parts, like the one created at MIT, should be “mirrored” and
expanded elsewhere.  Parts creation and characterization is underway at the
“protein-DNA logic” (PDL) level and is just beginning to be extended to what
might be called “post-translational logic” (PTL); the engineers and
scientists who are now learning to engineer biology by building
simple “toy” parts and systems should be encouraged to create more
sophisticated artifacts that find immediate and widespread practical
use.  Physical measurement technologies are now being developed by the
entire biological research community; synthetic biology will help to (i) specify
new types of measurements that better define composable parts and devices
(e.g., transcription rate in place of protein concentration) and (ii) develop
biological systems that can themselves be used to measure cellular state.
Lastly, tools that compile designs into encoded DNA are now being developed
for PDL systems; tool extension to other levels is necessary.
